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Max Abrahms has examined the lack of the strategic model as a lens to analysis 
terrorism. This model consist of three basic assumptions: (1) “Terrorists have 
consistent and stable political goals”, (2) “Terrorists evaluate their political 
options”, and (3) “Terrorism offers a superior political return”. Abrahms exposes 
that this model with its core assumptions is inadequate or even failed to grasp the 
real realm of terrorism. At least there are seven puzzles he can present to support his 
argument. Those seven puzzles includes (1) “coercive ineffectiveness”, (2) 
“terrorism as the first resort”, (3) “reflexive uncompromising terrorists”, (4) 
“protean political platforms”, (5) “anonymous attacks”, (6) “terrorist fratricide”, 
and (7) “never-ending terrorism”. In sum, different from the strategic model’s 
standpoint, he concludes that terrorism is engaged prevalently by social solidarity 
maximizers rather than by political maximizers. People involve into terrorism 
mainly to obtain social solidarity and not its political or ideological goals. For this 
reason, he argues that counterterrorism strategies should be redesigned less 
emphasized on divestment of terrorism’s political utility but more on its social 
utility. The later, according to Abrahms, can be taken in two ways, firstly, by 
splitting between organization members, and secondly, decreasing potential supply 
among ‘fragile’ populations for joining terrorism.  
R. Scott Appleby defines fundamentalism as “a specifiable pattern of religious 
militancy by which self-styled true believers attempt to arrest the erosion of 
religious identity, fortify the borders of the religious community, and create viable 
alternatives to secular structures and processes”. It does not necessarily that 
fundamentalism evokes violence and intolerance. But, Appleby finds convincingly 
that fundamentalism has religious exclusive orientation which may drive them to 
engage extremist violence. Across diversity among fundamentalist movements in the 
past or in the recent times he identifies common features characterizing what can be 
really called fundamentalism. Firstly, fundamentalism emerges as a response or 
reaction to secular influences that considered harmful for religious purity. The line is 
then drawn to demarcate between insiders and outsiders. Legitimatized by “selective 
retrieval of the sacred past”, provided by charismatic or authoritarian leaders, the 
outsiders or the others are portrayed as the false, impure, and infidel. Here, on 
reason of “emergency”, exceptions including the use of extremist violence may be 
taken by the true to purify human beings and their life under the light of religious 
truth. It seems that “exceptionalism” is used to justify the fundamentalist’s intention 
“to build a comprehensive religious alternative to secularism”.  
Muhammad Iqbal Ahnaf, through his study of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) 
and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), comes to conclusion that Muslim fundamentalist 
groups have systematically constructed the image of the other (Non-Muslim) as 
enemy. The mode of this construction is similar to what has been identified by 
Appleby above. It moves from ideologization, demonization, the claim of inevitable 
clash with the others, and imagination of the coming victory of Islam. All these are 
based on the superiority of Islam as the only true religion. Interestingly, this image 
does not necessarily provoke problems or confrontations in their daily relationships 
with the others (the enemy). This kind of relationship can be described as “symbolic 
violence” in term of Pierre Bourdieu or “rhetoric violence” in term of De Lauretis.  
Based on the three articles summarized in the previous paragraphs, I can say that 
violence may occur with or without religious reasons. Even violence that seems to 
be religious violence may occur with or without religious reasons. The reasons to 
engage violence may rise from the womb of social depression, economical 
deprivation, or political oppression. These make violence seen as a discursive 
reality. Here, I agree with Abrahms when he says that the heart of terrorism, secular 
or religious, lying on the pursuit of social benefits not of political ones. I see it can 
be used also to describe the phenomena of Hizbullah that wins loyalty of Lebanese 
impoverished people because its ability in performing contextual roles among them. 
But, however, it is too naïve if religious reason considered out of violence. Appleby 
shows to us that religious reason playing actively as the core of fundamentalist 
violence. The actors of violence in many cases are inspired and motivated deeply by 
and rooted in their religious faith. Appleby also indicates that religious violence may 
be carried out through mature preparations and definite goals. This finding 
consequently supports the strategic model’s thesis that undermined by Abrahms.  
Along with the fact that religious violence may be taken to obtain certain political or 
social ends, I keep a trust that religious interpretation still having vital influence to 
drive people engage violence. Religious interpretation gives epistemological basis 
which upon this fundamentalists legitimize their violence. Without religious 
references certain violence is hardly to be called religious violence. Even Ahnaf 
provides living examples, MMI and HTI in Indonesian context, that fundamentalist 
paradigm does not necessarily mean inciting violence. But, once again, in term of 
Bourdieu or Lauretis, that is violence as well.  
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